【双语阅读】大张旗鼓的金融监管改革.

　　为帮助广大考生更好地准备雅思、托福、SAT等考试，澳际留学特推出【英语学习】频道，涵盖基础英语、实用英语、娱乐英语等多项内容，在您通往成功的道路上做您最坚实的左膀右臂。

　　以下部分为【双语阅读】内容，本文介绍大张旗鼓的金融监管改革，中文翻译部分见第二页。

　　Overhauling financial regulation

　　The regulatory rumble begins

　　From The Economist print edition

　　In America and Europe, new rules are already running into stiff resistance—mostly from regulators themselves

　　“YOU want to move at the point where people still have the memory of the trauma,” Tim Geithner explained recently when asked about financial regulation. Aware that the crisis is moving into a new phase, with the emphasis shifting from firighting to working out how supervision should be restructured, America’s treasury secretary wants to seize the moment. He plans to unveil a comprehensive regulatory overhaul by mid-June. Barack Obama has said he wants to sign the changes into law by the year’s end.

　　In Europe, too, the pressure is on. “There’s no room for more delays,” José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, said on May 27th when he unveiled a blueprint for rorm of financial supervision. He announced plans to form two new grandly named institutions: a European Systemic Risk Council, which is supposed to provide early warning of possible risks, and a European System of Financial Supervisors, which would be a super-committee of regulators from across the European Union.

　　The goals of the two new institutions are admirable. Both are intended to correct a fundamental flaw in European bank regulation and supervision; namely, that although banks are free to operate across borders, they are supervised only by their home countries. Slack oversight by one country can, as the crisis has revealed, spread chaos across many. Yet it is not at all clear that the proposals have been thought through properly. “The European Commission is confusing speed with haste,” says Nicolas Véron of Bruegel, a think-tank in Brussels. “The governance, mandate and funding of these new authorities is not really addressed.” Britain, which has the biggest banking centre, is particularly concerned about the proposed rules, which may cede aspects of the City of London’s banking supervision to Brussels.

　　In America, meanwhile, the plans taking shape face resistance, partly from the bankers they will shackle but even more from regulators and lawmakers. Bankers accept they will be forced to build up bigger capital buffers, which will crimp profitability, and that the liquidity of their balance-sheets will be policed more intensively. The regulatory net will be cast over the “shadow” banking network of hedge funds, money-market funds and the like, to which much financial activity gravitated during the boom.

　　Big banks, however, still have enough lobbying power to ensure that not every decision goes against them. True, they are still licking their wounds after the recent passage of draconian credit-card rorms. But they are happier with the government’s proposals on derivatives, under which dealers will be able to continue peddling customised swap contracts away from exchanges, albeit with a higher capital charge.

　　As the crisis has deepened, American bankers have tempered their opposition to the idea of new rules that reduce the chances of another blow-up. “Would I accept regulation that slows innovation a bit and knocks three percentage points off my returns if it promised greater stability? Absolutely,” says the head of one large bank.

　　For some, more stringent regulation even has a silver lining. With tougher mortgage rules, banks will no longer have to lower their standards to compete with the industry’s unregulated parts. The survivors could also benit from higher barriers to entry.

　　On the whole, Wall Street sees a welcome disconnect between the Obama administration’s rhetoric and its actions. The Treasury is “gradually learning” how to square the circle of showing that it understands the public’s anger on the one hand, and maintaining a dynamic financial sector on the other, says one bank lobbyist. Another test of its capacity to resist pitchfork-wielding urges will come in the next few weeks, when it is expected to issue guidelines on executive pay.

　　The stiffest resistance to change is coming not from Wall Street but from Washington, DC, where government officials, regulators and congressional leaders are locked in turf wars and ideological battles. “Opinion has splintered. Everyone is fighting everyone,” says Bert Ely, a consultant on regulatory issues.

　　Even the main banking agencies are at odds with each other. Sheila Bair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency, have fallen out over Ms Bair’s deposit-insurance rorms. Mr Dugan also opposes the FDIC’s push for sole authority to liquidate failing non-banks, as it already does with banks.

　　Worse, there is no consensus on the proposed systemic-risk regulator, which would identify and act on emerging “macro-prudential” dangers. The administration wants the Fed to assume the role, but many in Congress oppose this. Dick Shelby, an influential senator, has accused Mr Geithner of using the crisis to hand the Fed unacceptable levels of power. Meanwhile, Ms Bair has suggested that systemic regulation be done (or at least overseen) by a multi-agency council, an idea that is gaining traction even if others (including, again, Mr Dugan) worry that such supervision-by-committee is a recipe for inaction.

　　An even bigger battle is brewing over the shake-up of existing regulators. No one doubts that the archaic, overlapping patchwork of agencies needs modernising, with regulation rocused on a firm’s activities rather than its legal form. Reportedly, the White House is considering rolling the four banking-supervision agencies into one, though the idea is still in flux.

　　But an embryonic plan to create a super-regulator for consumer products, such as mortgages, credit cards and mutual funds, is already encountering stiff opposition. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which would lose out in such a shuffle, has powerful friends on Capitol Hill, especially on the Senate banking committee that oversees the agency—and any overhaul would require congressional approval. Public pension funds have also joined together to lobby against a reduction in the SEC’s power.

　　Moreover, the economically rational may not be politically feasible. Though it would make sense to merge the SEC with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which regulates derivatives, Congress’s powerful agriculture committee would probably block the move.

　　Debate about other thorny issues, such as what restrictions to place on, or whether to dismantle, banks that are too big to fail has barely begun. Congressional leaders cannot even agree on whether to pass new rules in pieces or roll them up into one mega-bill.

　　All of which explains why pundits now expect to see few, if any, further financial rorms passed in 2009. Delay could play into the financial industry’s hands, to the extent that it reduces the likelihood of heat-of-the-moment laws like Sarbanes-Oxley, rushed through after the Enron scandal. But if measures that would increase stability fall victim to politics, everyone will be worse off.

　　【中文对照翻译】

　　金融监管大变革

　　大张旗鼓的金融监管改革开始了

　　摘自《经济学人》杂志

　　在美国和欧洲，新的监管制度已经在遭受严重的抵制 – 而大部分的抵制来自监管者本身

　　最近，在被问及金融监管问题时盖特纳解释道：“在民众仍然对伤痛记忆深刻的时候你是想要做出改变的”。在意识到危机已经进行到一个新的阶段，并且在一直强调要从救火队员转变到制定出监管应该如何改革时，美国财政部想要把握住时机。盖特纳计划在六月中旬开始对金融监管进行一项彻头彻尾的改革。巴拉克-奥巴马说过他希望在年底前将监管改革签署为正式法案。

　　欧洲也面临着同样的压力。在5月27号公布一份金融监管改革的蓝本时，欧盟主席巴罗佐称：“已经没有耽搁的余地了”他宣布计划成立两个名字响当当的机构：一个是欧洲系统风险理事会，希望它能就可能出现的风险提供早期警示，另一个是欧洲金融监管者系统，这应该是一个汇集了全欧盟监管者的超级委员会。

　　成立这两个机构的初衷是很好的。二者都倾向于修正欧洲银行制度和监管的基础法案;也就是说，尽管银行可以自由的进行跨境操作，但是他们只受本国政府的监管。就像危机所揭示的那样，一个国家的疏忽会将混乱延伸到其它很多国家。然而，这项计划的可能性有没有被考虑过还不清楚。“欧盟委员会将速度和草率搞混淆了” 布鲁塞尔的一家咨询业巨头Bruegel的Nicolas Véron说道，“这些新的权力机构的管理方法，授权以及资金来源都还没有真正的安排好”拥有最大的银行中心的英国尤其关心被提及的这些制度，因为它们可能会将伦敦城银行的部分监管权转交给布鲁塞尔。

　　同时，在美国，监管制度的改革遭遇了严酷的正面抵制，抵制部分来自会被束缚的银行家，但是来自监管者和法律制定者的抵制甚至更猛烈。银行家可以接受今后被强制要求设立更大的资本金缓冲，虽然这样可以抑制其收益率，他们也能接受更强的针对资产负债平衡表流动性的管辖。监管网络会覆盖到涉及对冲基金的灰色银行体系，货币市场基金等等诸如此类在繁荣时期吸引了大量金融行为的方面。

　　然而，大型的银行仍然具有足够的游说能力来确保并非每一项改革决议都是针对他们的。的确，在经历了最近针对信用卡的严酷改革后他们还处在舔舐伤口的阶段。但是政府关于衍生品的改革提议令银行家们感到很高兴，尽管该提议要求的资本金充足率更高，但是在这一提议下证券商可以继续在交易所外兜售按客户特定需求制定的掉期交易合同。

　　随着危机的加深，美国的银行家们为监管者想到了一个办法：制定新的制度来减少危机再次大面积爆发的可能性。一家大银行的行长称：“我会接受一项将创新速度略微减慢并且会减少我3%收入的制度吗?如果这种新的制度承诺带来更大的稳定性的话，我当然会接受。”

　　对一些人来说，更严谨的监管制度甚至可以带来黑暗中的一丝曙光。在更加苛刻的贷款条件下，银行再都不能为了迎合企业的非监管部分而降低自己的借款标准。银行界的幸存者们还可以从更加高的准入门槛中获益。

　　从整体来看，华尔街经历了奥巴马班组的言行不一。一位银行说客称：“财政部正在逐渐的学习如何一方面做一些自己力不能及的事情以表示他们能够理解政府的愤怒，另一方面维持一个生机勃勃的财政部门”.另外一项针对其顶住权利机构催促能力的测试会在接下来几周公布，也就是财政部公布高管薪资制度的时候。

　　对监管制度改革最顽强的抵制并不是来自华尔街而是来自华盛顿，华盛顿的政府官员，监管者和国会领导人们正深陷在地位之争和意识形态斗争中。监管制度方面的咨询专家Bert Ely称：“关于改革的观点被搞得七零八落，每个人都在反对每一个观点”。

　　即使是主要的银行机构间意见也不一致。联邦储蓄保险公司的Sheila Bair和财政部金融局的John Dugan曾就Bair先生提出的储蓄保险改革的想法展开过争论。同样，Dugan先生也反对联邦储蓄保险公司推行的对衰退的非银行机构进行清算的单一职权主张，这一主张曾经运用在银行机构身上。

　　更糟的是，各方还没有就系统风险监管达成一致意见，而这项监管可以识别并作用于还处在萌芽状态的会对宏观经济产生重大影响的危险。管理者希望联储能扮演这一角色，但是国会的很多人士反对这样的提议。一位具有影响力的参议员Dick Shelby曾经指控盖特纳借危机之际给予了联储过多令人无法接受的权利。同时，Bair先生建议由一家综合机构理事会来执行(或者至少是监督)系统监管，尽管包括许多人Dugan在内的许多人担心这样的监管委员会会引发无作为，但是Bair先生的建议还是很具有吸引力。

　　针对现有监管的革新而展开的更大的一场争论正在酝酿中。各机构之间陈旧的相互重叠的链接需要通过将重心重新转移到公司行为上而非其法律形式来进行革新，这一点毋庸置疑。据称，白宫正在考虑将四家银行监管机构合并成一家，尽管这一想法变数还很大。

　　针对诸如贷款，信用卡和共同基金这样的消费者产品成立一个超级监管机构的计划还处在萌芽状态就已经遭到了强烈的抵制。在这轮洗牌中会惨遭重创的美国证券交易委员会同美国国会尤其是负责对其进行监管的参议员银行委员会之间有着深刻的友谊，而任何一项革新都是需要国会点头的。公共抚恤基金也加入到了削减SEC 权利的游说中。

　　此外，经济学上合理的东西在政治层面上可能并不具有执行力。尽管将SEC和商品期货交易委员会合并在监管衍生品上确实有意义，但是在国会权势巨大的农业特别委员会可能会阻碍这样的变革。

　　在其他一些几首的问题上，争论才刚刚开始，例如：针对那些规模太大从而表现不好的银行，该执行什么样的制约或是是否要拆分一些银行。国会领导们甚至在是否要逐一的通过新制度还是将所有的制度都揉成一个巨无霸的法案上都无法达成共识。

　　所有这些都能用来解释为什么权威人士预计09年可以通过的新的金融监管制度(如果有的话)是凤毛麟角。金融监管改革的姗姗来迟会正中金融业下怀，同时会达到像当年的萨班斯•奥克斯利法案一样轰动一时的效果，萨班斯•奥克斯利法案是在安然公司丑闻后仓促制定的。但是，如果一项本可以提高稳定性的措施沦为政治受害者的话，所有人的处境都会变得更糟糕。

　　为帮助广大考生更好地准备雅思、托福、SAT等考试，澳际留学特推出【英语学习】频道，涵盖基础英语、实用英语、娱乐英语等多项内容，在您通往成功的道路上做您最坚实的左膀右臂。

　　以下部分为【双语阅读】内容，本文介绍大张旗鼓的金融监管改革，中文翻译部分见第二页。

　　Overhauling financial regulation

　　The regulatory rumble begins

　　From The Economist print edition

　　In America and Europe, new rules are already running into stiff resistance—mostly from regulators themselves

　　“YOU want to move at the point where people still have the memory of the trauma,” Tim Geithner explained recently when asked about financial regulation. Aware that the crisis is moving into a new phase, with the emphasis shifting from firighting to working out how supervision should be restructured, America’s treasury secretary wants to seize the moment. He plans to unveil a comprehensive regulatory overhaul by mid-June. Barack Obama has said he wants to sign the changes into law by the year’s end.

　　In Europe, too, the pressure is on. “There’s no room for more delays,” José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, said on May 27th when he unveiled a blueprint for rorm of financial supervision. He announced plans to form two new grandly named institutions: a European Systemic Risk Council, which is supposed to provide early warning of possible risks, and a European System of Financial Supervisors, which would be a super-committee of regulators from across the European Union.

　　The goals of the two new institutions are admirable. Both are intended to correct a fundamental flaw in European bank regulation and supervision; namely, that although banks are free to operate across borders, they are supervised only by their home countries. Slack oversight by one country can, as the crisis has revealed, spread chaos across many. Yet it is not at all clear that the proposals have been thought through properly. “The European Commission is confusing speed with haste,” says Nicolas Véron of Bruegel, a think-tank in Brussels. “The governance, mandate and funding of these new authorities is not really addressed.” Britain, which has the biggest banking centre, is particularly concerned about the proposed rules, which may cede aspects of the City of London’s banking supervision to Brussels.

　　In America, meanwhile, the plans taking shape face resistance, partly from the bankers they will shackle but even more from regulators and lawmakers. Bankers accept they will be forced to build up bigger capital buffers, which will crimp profitability, and that the liquidity of their balance-sheets will be policed more intensively. The regulatory net will be cast over the “shadow” banking network of hedge funds, money-market funds and the like, to which much financial activity gravitated during the boom.

　　Big banks, however, still have enough lobbying power to ensure that not every decision goes against them. True, they are still licking their wounds after the recent passage of draconian credit-card rorms. But they are happier with the government’s proposals on derivatives, under which dealers will be able to continue peddling customised swap contracts away from exchanges, albeit with a higher capital charge.

　　As the crisis has deepened, American bankers have tempered their opposition to the idea of new rules that reduce the chances of another blow-up. “Would I accept regulation that slows innovation a bit and knocks three percentage points off my returns if it promised greater stability? Absolutely,” says the head of one large bank.

　　For some, more stringent regulation even has a silver lining. With tougher mortgage rules, banks will no longer have to lower their standards to compete with the industry’s unregulated parts. The survivors could also benit from higher barriers to entry.

　　On the whole, Wall Street sees a welcome disconnect between the Obama administration’s rhetoric and its actions. The Treasury is “gradually learning” how to square the circle of showing that it understands the public’s anger on the one hand, and maintaining a dynamic financial sector on the other, says one bank lobbyist. Another test of its capacity to resist pitchfork-wielding urges will come in the next few weeks, when it is expected to issue guidelines on executive pay.

　　The stiffest resistance to change is coming not from Wall Street but from Washington, DC, where government officials, regulators and congressional leaders are locked in turf wars and ideological battles. “Opinion has splintered. Everyone is fighting everyone,” says Bert Ely, a consultant on regulatory issues.

　　Even the main banking agencies are at odds with each other. Sheila Bair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency, have fallen out over Ms Bair’s deposit-insurance rorms. Mr Dugan also opposes the FDIC’s push for sole authority to liquidate failing non-banks, as it already does with banks.

　　Worse, there is no consensus on the proposed systemic-risk regulator, which would identify and act on emerging “macro-prudential” dangers. The administration wants the Fed to assume the role, but many in Congress oppose this. Dick Shelby, an influential senator, has accused Mr Geithner of using the crisis to hand the Fed unacceptable levels of power. Meanwhile, Ms Bair has suggested that systemic regulation be done (or at least overseen) by a multi-agency council, an idea that is gaining traction even if others (including, again, Mr Dugan) worry that such supervision-by-committee is a recipe for inaction.

　　An even bigger battle is brewing over the shake-up of existing regulators. No one doubts that the archaic, overlapping patchwork of agencies needs modernising, with regulation rocused on a firm’s activities rather than its legal form. Reportedly, the White House is considering rolling the four banking-supervision agencies into one, though the idea is still in flux.

　　But an embryonic plan to create a super-regulator for consumer products, such as mortgages, credit cards and mutual funds, is already encountering stiff opposition. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which would lose out in such a shuffle, has powerful friends on Capitol Hill, especially on the Senate banking committee that oversees the agency—and any overhaul would require congressional approval. Public pension funds have also joined together to lobby against a reduction in the SEC’s power.

　　Moreover, the economically rational may not be politically feasible. Though it would make sense to merge the SEC with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which regulates derivatives, Congress’s powerful agriculture committee would probably block the move.

　　Debate about other thorny issues, such as what restrictions to place on, or whether to dismantle, banks that are too big to fail has barely begun. Congressional leaders cannot even agree on whether to pass new rules in pieces or roll them up into one mega-bill.

　　All of which explains why pundits now expect to see few, if any, further financial rorms passed in 2009. Delay could play into the financial industry’s hands, to the extent that it reduces the likelihood of heat-of-the-moment laws like Sarbanes-Oxley, rushed through after the Enron scandal. But if measures that would increase stability fall victim to politics, everyone will be worse off.

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