GMAT考试 3月6日更新GMAT阅读机经(十四).

　　GMAT考试已于12年3月1日更换题库，以下是2012年3月的GMAT阅读机经更新，更新日期从2012年3月1日起至3月6日，目前共18题。澳际留学祝大家GMAT考试顺利!

　　The Case for Carbon Taxes

　　A carbon tax would offer a broader scope for emissions reductions. Trading systems can only be implemented among private firms or countries - not individual consumers (transaction costs would be prohibitively high if commuters needed permits to fill up their car with gas). Carbon taxes extend to all carbon-based fuel consumption, including gasoline, home heating oil and aviation fuels. Trading systems may not be able to reach parts of the transportation and service sectors which could account for 30-50% of emissions.

　　A system of tradable permits entails significant transaction costs, which include: search costs, such as fees paid to brokers or exchange institutions to find trading partners; negotiating costs; approval costs, such as delays or fees incurred during the approval process; and insurance costs. Conversely, taxes involve little transaction cost, over all stages of their lifetime.

　　Carbon taxes have dynamic ficiency advantages that trading lacks because taxes offer a permanent incentive to reduce emissions. Technological and procedural changes, and subsequent technology diffusion, will lead to reductions in permit price (i.e. since emissions goals will be easier to meet, there will be a decrease in permit demand, and hence, a decrease in permit price). Trading systems may not be able self-adjust in response to rapid change, and thus provide the permanent incentive of a tax system to reduce emissions. In short, emissions trading must have some method of removing permits from the system or other method of ratcheting-up permit prices.

　　Taxes are not susceptible to strategic behavior by firms or non-governmental organizations which may harm the contractual environment of the market. Non-governmental organizations or even private individuals that object to the concept of purchasing the "right to pollute" may purchase large numbers of permits to drive up costs of CO2 abatement. Likewise firms may hoard permits, driving up the prices for competitors.

　　Emissions trading proposals are highly complicated and technical, unlike taxes which are an extremely familiar instrument to policymakers. Many technical issues would need to be resolved bore trading could begin, including treatment of sinks, different GHGs, monitoring, enforcement, etc. Ongoing costs are also low for tax systems because of the lack of monitoring and enforcement requirements.

　　Emissions trading may prevent meaningful domestic reductions from taking place. If the global climate system is to be stabilized, emissions reductions should take place sooner, rather than later, in the countries most responsible for the problem. This concern relates to profound equity issues among developed, developing and transitional economies.

　　Carbon taxes earn revenue, which can be "recycled" back into the economy by reducing taxes on income, labor and/or capital investment. This is often rerred to as a "revenue neutral" tax and may be part of a broader program of "environmental tax rorm" (ETR) which attempts to shift the tax burden from "goods" like labor, to "bads" like pollution. Evidence indicates that there can be profound employment, distributional and political benits to such an approach. Permit systems have the potential to earn revenue, but only if permits are auctioned.

　　The Politics: Who likes which policy, and why? United States is the strongest proponent of emissions trading and fought hard to include trading in the Kyoto Protocol. The reasons are straightforward. Relative to other industrialized countries, the US is energy inficient and has high per capita carbon dioxide emissions levels. Thus carbon taxes would penalize the US relative to other, less fossil fuel dependent nations. US industry is also strongly against any taxation measures to achieve GHG reductions. Trading would allow US firms to purchase emissions allowances from other countries, and avoid domestic reductions.

　　The European Union has traditionally been in favor of strong coordinated policies and measures, such as energy/carbon taxes, among countries. Because the EU is already relatively energy ficient (improvements have been made steadily since the late 1980s, through energy deregulation, taxes and agreements with industrial sectors), carbon taxes would be less of a burden than in the US. In Kyoto, the EU was against emissions trading, but was unable to overcome US support for trading. Therore, EU forts have been channeled into developing fective rules and guidelines for a trading system. For example, the EU has recently announced that at least 50% of countries&apos reduction targets should be achieved domestically.

　　The Russian Federation and the Ukraine are major supporters of emissions trading, and would stand to gain financially. Their emissions reduction targets are 0% reductions by 2008-2012 based on 1990 levels (i.e. to remain at 1990 levels through 2012). However, because of the economic collapse of the former Soviet bloc, and the closure of inficient power plants, these countries are already 30% below 1990 levels. If they were allocated trading permits (based on their emissions target), they would be able to immediately flood the market and receive major cash inflows. The trading of allowances that represent past emissions reductions (which are not the result of climate considerations) is called "hot air."

　　Developing countries (known as G77/China in UNFCCC negotiations) are extremely cautious of emissions trading, and view it primarily as a "loophole" that the US and Japan can use to avoid their domestic responsibility. They are in favor of rules and guidelines that ensure equitable allocation of allowances and monitoring provisions. Currently, trading is being discussed only as a means for Annex 1 (industrialized and transitional countries), since developing countries do not have binding emissions reduction targets. However, if the system were to be extended globally in the future, developing countries would demand that permit allocations be based on population, rather than historic national emissions levels. This position is indicative of the strong equity concerns held by developing countries. Developing countries favor the principle of carbon taxes - as long as they are levied on rich countries and not poor ones.

　　以上就是3月6日更新的GMAT阅读机经，考生可以适当借鉴，并通过练习来掌握GMAT阅读的解题规律，从而在GMAT考试中发挥出更好的水平。 相关链接：

1.GMAT考试 3月6日更新GMAT阅读机经(十三)

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3.详解GMAT语法必备语法知识点：the same as

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